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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
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COUNTRY Yugoslavia

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SUBJECT
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1. "The activity of Yugoslav political emigres as a whole is weak and paralyzed because of the total lack of a unified policy. The few capable political personalities lack support. Political speculators on the other hand are very active. Foreign secret organizations (not only from the East) find in Yugoslavia a copious hunting ground and prevent the Yugoslav political society from regaining its health and from preparing for a struggle to restore a non-Communist Yugoslavia. A campaign against the monarchical institution, as well as against the King as an individual, takes first place. Sometimes the tactics change and assume the form of a campaign for the King, but always with the same end in view: to compromise and blacken this institution which today represents the strongest popular antithesis to Tito - the King. Speculators as well as republicans share today the opinion that the time is favorable for combating the renewal of a Yugoslav monarchy. Their stand is strengthened by the fact that the entire Balkan peninsula, with the exception of Greece, is made up of republics as well as by the fact that neighboring Italy is also a republic. This is the explanation for the increasingly republican, or at least personal, attitude against the King which has lately been observed among certain Yugoslav political emigre groups.
2. "I do not know what the intrinsic attitude of the governing circles in London and Washington may be toward an anti-Tito Yugoslavia and the restoration of a monarchy. However, I can state with conviction that it is no longer possible to count with any certitude on a favorable attitude of these powers, because they betrayed the country to Tito in the fall of 1944 and particularly because of the irresponsible sympathies which they now manifest towards Tito in view of his personal conflict with Stalin.

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Should they feel that it is in their interest to do so, they would abandon King Peter II and National Yugoslavia for a third time, as they are always ready to do, whether with Chiang Kai-shek, Korea or Bao Dai. Republican tendencies, or the momentary unpopularity of monarchical institutions in Europe and the United States will serve as a useful pretext to win public opinion. One must not forget that Europe, which before World War I had only two republics, France and Switzerland, now has seventeen republics with something over 400 million inhabitants. There is a possibility that the situation may change in time but one must not forget that at the present time even the demise of leftist republics does not necessarily warrant the restoration of the monarchy. Europe, it appears, is still searching for a form of government which will be sufficiently strong to resist the revolutionary tempest, and to protect itself from falling into another Fascist or semi-Fascist regime. The concomitant difficulties and hardships of this search encountered by the regimes of the parliamentary democracies in France and in Great Britain, offer to many the pretext for a semi-dictatorial regime such as that of Portugal or Turkey. The present favorable attitude toward Turkey, Portugal and Franco's regime, is based primarily upon the fact that these regimes are already established, and have girded themselves with a solid military, police, and political apparatus. It is also based upon the fact that these countries are established powers whose strength has been tested in the past, and who appear to be tomorrow's 'precious allies' in case of a conflict with the Soviet Union. A statesman who at this late date would like to establish an analogous dictatorial regime, would not be able to count upon such recognition.

3. "I have thus indicated the obstacles which stand in the way of the re-establishment of a National Yugoslavia and a monarchy. I look upon these obstacles with great concern, for I likewise consider the institution of the King and a monarchy as being possibly a fixed idea, but an idea, however, which has the power of becoming reality. The Serb-Croat antagonism nurtured through the ages, the Catholic-Orthodox antagonism, greatly increased by the terrible events of the first years of the war, prevent one from reflecting without some concern on the periodical electoral campaigns for a president of the possible future republic, which would unavoidably turn into Serb and Croat conflicts, with the result that the elected president would never have any other authority but that of being either the Croat or the Serb president.

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The memory of the grandfather and father of the present King, both of which in his own manner and style left a strong impression on the history of our nation, makes me believe that their successor has the ambition that his name too will some day stand third to these two already glorious names, when one day under his governing authority Yugoslavia will be secured for a great and happy future. This faith of mine is strengthened by information and stories of the King's patriotic interest and conscientious studies of all the national questions, related to me by the King's former school mates.

5. "The King is the symbol and synthesis of the whole of the population and of Yugoslavia. For this reason he is most careful, in all questions, to avoid giving the appearance of belonging only to one clan or one portion of the population. Several of the King's latest speeches are proof of his awareness of these obligations.

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6. "Although political groups in exile today are disintegrated, the King can, for the national cause, offer at least some fictitious feeling of unity and system by gathering these groups about him from time to time. Both abroad and at home this will create a vision of some future anti-Communist Yugoslavia, as well as the impression that the King is not isolated from these who are working abroad for a national Yugoslavia.
7. "There are excellent patriots and well-meaning workers among the politicians in exile. There are perhaps people of minor importance who also enjoy the confidence of one part or another of the Yugoslav population. The King will serve the general cause and the prestige of the crown if he maintains at least some 'diplomatic' relations with all such workers. It is important that these contacts should be more frequent. It is also important that when such contacts take place they be released unofficially to the press, i.e. 'Yesterday on the occasion of the Krsna Slava King Peter II received the following former ministers.....'; 'Today, upon the occasion of the anniversary of 27 March, King Peter II asked the following to stay for dinner...'. Such things maintain the impression that there is another Yugoslavia, although without authority or power, in addition to the Yugoslavia of Tito.
8. "The campaign to tear down the popularity of the King (which on 27 March 1941 was at its peak), not only is carried on by Tito's regime, but also by a large portion of our emigres, some of whom are sympathizers of a republic, some of whom are Serboophiles, and some of whom are anti-Yugoslav, while others again unwittingly become the prey of inimical intrigues. Doubtless, there exist people who work directly for such centers of political intrigue. One must not underestimate the influence of this campaign. Therefore, the King should make every effort to become popular in a convenient and discreet manner, sincerely and without courtly fanfare.
9. "It is very good that the King speaks to his people over the radio. Such intervention will have the best influence if the King were to choose some general date of national significance in Yugoslavia and if his speech were formulated along general national lines, without a direct attack or polemics concerning the people currently in power. Such dates are the anniversary of Kosovo on 1 December, Saint Sava on 27 January, Strossmayer's birthday on 4 February, Christmas, New Year and Easter (both the Orthodox and Catholic).
10. "There are many Yugoslav students in exile. In this connection, the following ideas, which may contribute to the King's popularity, are offered for consideration:
 - a. "A scholarship for the three best Yugoslav students in Paris, without regard to national surname, religion, et cetera. This should be awarded upon the decision of the faculty of the Paris University or the Minister of Education and also upon recommendation of a special committee personally appointed by the King.
 - b. "A special fund for several Sveta Sava scholarships for Yugoslav students in France.
 - c. "A students mess should be organized in Paris to which the King could contribute an initial sum. I feel that the initiative should be taken by Yugoslavs who have at their disposal financial means, and also by the French.
 - d. "The King should visit the colonies of Yugoslav workers in Germany, Belgium and Austria. The fact that the King recently visited some such colonies in England had a very beneficial effect."

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